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ABSTRACT
Is the term enemy combatant an established legal category of persons under international
law? Has the President exceeded his constitutional authority in classifying United States citizens
who are suspected terrorists as enemy combatants?
In 2018 a U.S. citizen was released after being held for 13 months as an enemy
combatant. He was detained without being charged with a crime and without the ability to
challenge the legality of his detention. This thesis serves two purposes. First, it will seek to trace
the history of the term enemy combatant and highlight the evolution of its use by the executive
branch. This thesis then examines whether the executive has exceeded his constitutional
authority to classify a United States citizen as an enemy combatant. While most of the literature
focuses on the treatment and detention of enemy combatants, existing scholarship largely
overlooks the issue of authority to classify enemy combatants. This thesis will argue that the
executive is overstepping the boundaries of its presidential power when the executive branch
creates the criteria (a legislative function) for enemy combatants and applies the criteria in the
classification of enemy combatants (a judicial function). This qualitative study will use
normative legal research focusing on the principles of the law in classifying a suspected terrorist
as an enemy combatant as well as the legal history of the term. The analysis of the legal history
of the term enemy combatant will be completed by content analysis using Nvivo 12 software of
various government documents as well as case studies of enemy combatant cases.

iii

This thesis dedicated to those who stood in the arena with me. To those who have watched me
strive valiantly and who have seen me err. To those who have cheered me on with great
enthusiasm and now celebrate the triumph of this high achievement of daring greatly.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Summary
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the United
States found itself in uncharted territory. It sought to fight terrorism as a war instead of
prosecuting transnational crimes.1 The country was at war, not with another state, but a war
against terrorism. On September 16, 2001, President George Bush described the United States'
crusade as a "war against terrorism.” This crusade came to be known as the Global War on
Terror. Congress, in turn, authorized the use of military force on September 20, 2001:

“That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons”2

Government rhetoric has been that in indefinitely detaining a suspected terrorist, the
United States is abiding by the guidelines of the law of war. However, those detained at the
outset of the Global War on Terror were declared not to be protected by Geneva Conventions. At

1

Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 Texas International Law
Journal (2007).
2
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution 224 (2001).

1

the beginning of 2002, the White House circulated memoranda that asserted that "terrorism
renders obsolete the [Geneva Conventions].”3
The president used his power to formulate the term “enemy combatant” as a legal
convenience. This status removes most of the rights of an individual under both domestic and
international law. In essence, the executive is using "war rules" when "criminal law rules” would
suffice. This paper will trace the origin of the term “enemy combatant” and how it has become a
tool of the government to hold suspected terrorists indefinitely without charging them with a
crime. This paper will then argue that the executive is overstepping the boundaries of its
presidential power when the executive branch creates the criteria for enemy combatants (a
legislative function) and applies the criteria in the classification of enemy combatants (a judicial
function).
The law of war was a set of norms and customary practices of nations and became
codified in treaties that the United States signed known as the Geneva Conventions.4 Under the
Geneva Convention in 1949, there are only two designations for individuals: civilian and
combatant. The Convention distinctly declined to create a third class of persons. Even with
presented with the opportunity again in 1977 at Additional Protocol I there was not a third status
created.5 Scholars who are experts in the laws of war argue that “every person in enemy hands
must have some status under international law; he is either a prisoner of war… a civilian…or…a
member of the medical personnel…There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can

3

Carl Christol, The American Challenge (University Press of America, Inc. 2009).
M. C. Dorf, The Detention and Trial of Enemy Combatants: A Drama in Three Branches, 122 Political
Science Quarterly (2007).
5
Mark David 'Max Maxwell & Sean M. Watts, 'Unlawful Enemy Combatant': Status, Theory of Culpability, or
Neither?, 5 Journal of International Criminal (2007).
4
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be outside the law.”6 In regards to prisoners of war under Common Article 3, both the civilian
and combatant have the right to counsel, an impartial court, confront witnesses, and regular
judicial procedures. Due process for individuals captured on the battlefield is the same regardless
of their status as civilian or combatant. A combatant has the right to participate directly in the
hostilities. If captured they cannot be tried for taking part in the hostilities. However, when
civilians take up arms, they are not immune like combatants and may be tried under the laws of
war or domestic law.7 The term “enemy combatant” or “unlawful enemy combatant” is not a
term of art in the law of war. There are two distinct differences between lawful and unlawful
combatants. Lawful combatants have combat immunity and are given prisoner of war status if
captured. They may be tried by domestic courts or an international tribunal for war crimes.
Lawful combatants are not tried for participating in the hostilities. Unlawful combatants are not
privy to combat immunity and can be prosecuted for participating in the hostilities by the
domestic laws of the country who has jurisdiction over them. If their actions rise to a serious
breach of the Geneva conventions they can be tried for those war crimes under domestic or
international law.
Importance of Topic
The following are two cases that highlight the difference in how a suspected terrorist that
can be tried by the United States' government and treated based on whether they are designated
an enemy combatant. Both cases also highlight the significance in the classification of a

6

J.S. Pictet (ed.). Commentary: IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War. International Committee of the Red Cross: Geneva 1958
7
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
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suspected terrorist as an enemy combatant. In September of 2017, John Doe, a U.S. Citizen, was
detained after his capture in Syria. The U.S. government has accused John Doe of being a
member of and fighting for ISIS. After his initial detention, the Pentagon declared that John Doe
was an enemy combatant. The government detained John Doe for over a year without charging
him with a crime or a ruling on whether or not his designation as an enemy combatant or
detention is legal.8 This case demonstrates the ability of the United States government to detain
a U.S. citizen for 13 months without charging him with a crime. The government released John
Doe to Bahrain where reportedly his wife and child are residing. How can a citizen of the United
States be held for that long without due process afforded to a citizen under the Constitution?
According to court documents, the government tried to release him back into Syria, but the court
ruled that government could not forcefully send him to Syria without proving they had the
authority to keep him under military detention.9 His release caused the question of whether or not
the government had the authority to detain John Doe to remain unanswered; however, the
government has set precedence in their ability to hold a U.S. Citizen for a significant amount of
time without charging them.
In October of 2017, Sayfullo Saipov, a permanent U.S. resident, drove a truck in a terror
attack in New York City killing eight people on a bike path only blocks away from the World

8

Charlie Callimcahi Savage, Rukmini Schmitt, Eric, American ISIS Suspect Is Freed After Being Held More
Than a Year, The New York Times(2018), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/us/politics/isisjohn-doe-released-abdulrahman-alsheikh.html.
9
Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, (United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit May 7,
2018)
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Trade Center.10 In the days following the attack, there was a call from Senators, including John
McCain, to classify Saipov, the attacker as an enemy combatant.
“The terrorist attack in New York is the latest brutal, horrific example of the war that
radical Islamist extremists are waging against our nation and our way of life. From Orlando to
San Bernardino and Boston to Manhattan, we must not consider these attacks on our homeland in
isolation, but rather recognize them for what they are: acts of war. As such, the New York terror
suspect should be held and interrogated—thoroughly, responsibly, and humanely—as an enemy
combatant consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict. He should not be read Miranda Rights, as
enemy combatants are not entitled to them. As soon as possible, the administration should notify
Congress how it plans to proceed with the interrogation and trial of this suspect.”11
The White House agreed with McCain and stated it considered Saipov, an enemy
combatant. However, prosecutors charged Saipov in federal court with eight counts of murder,
twelve counts of attempted murder, racketeering, and providing material support to the Islamic
State group. The court set Saipov's trial for October 2019.
Is the term enemy combatant included anywhere in the LOAC as McCain states? Why is
Saipov not classified and treated as an enemy combatant like John Doe?
The United States needs to have an actual detention policy that values the policy over
politics. Our values as a nation make it imperative that Congress passes legislation that addresses

10

Robert Chesney, et al., Back to the Future on Detention and Military Commissions, Lawfare (2017).

11

https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=47259DC1-98E3-41D78D59-3A539022DB98
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citizen and non-citizen suspected terrorists and whether they are apprehended domestically or
internationally.
At the heart of the importance of this issue is the status of enemy combatant violates both
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for the accused. The only command that the U.S.
Constitution repeats is the Due Process Clause. This clause is violated with the classification of a
U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant when that designation results in the denial of due process.
Persons must be afforded due process before the government deprives them of their liberty. The
Fourth Amendment declares that people have the right to be secure in their persons against
unreasonable seizures. If the government arrests a person without a warrant, they are required to
be brought before a neutral magistrate to determine probable cause, typically within 48 hours.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that a person cannot be held to answer for a crime unless
indicted by a grand jury. It also holds that the government cannot deprive a person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. Judge Henry Friendly of the 2nd circuit court listed the
elements of due process:
“1. An unbiased tribunal;
2. Notice and grounds for the proposed action;
3. An opportunity to show why the proposed action should not be taken;
4. The right to call witnesses;
5. The right to know opposing evidence;
6. The right to have the decision based only on the evidence presented;
7. The opportunity to be represented by counsel;
8. A record of the proceeding;
9. A statement of reasons;

6

10. Public attendance; and
11. Availability of judicial review”12
Classifying and labeling a suspect as an enemy combatant gives the executive power to
indefinitely detain, try by military commission, and use targeted killing.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla is an example of a case that raises legal issues when the executive
classifies a suspect as an enemy combatant:13
Table 1: Decisions in Rumsfeld v. Padilla

Date

Court

Decision

12/4/02

Southern District Court for

The President has authority to detain
citizens as enemy combatants captured on
American soil during times of war.

New York
12/18/03

United States Court of

The President does not have the authority
to detain Padilla militarily because …

Appeals for the Second
Circuit
6/28/05

United States Supreme

Dismissed because Padilla should have
filed in South Carolina.

Court
2/28/05

United States District Court
for the District of South

The President does not have the authority
to detain Padilla because …, Padilla must
either be released or criminally charged.

Carolina

12

Edward D. Re, Due Process, Judicial Review, and the Rights of the Individual, Cleveland State Law Review
(1991).
13
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (Supreme Court of the United States June 28, 2004, Decided).
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Date

Court

Decision

9/9/05

United States Court of

The President has the authority to detain
Padilla under the AUMF

Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit
11/17/05

United States District Court

Indictment against Padilla

for the Southern District of
Florida
12/21/05

United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth

Denied the Government’s motion to
authorize Padilla to be transferred to
civilian law enforcement custody.

Circuit
1/4/06

United States Supreme

Granted request to transfer Padilla to civil
law enforcement custody.

Court
4/22/07

United States District Court

Trial

for the Southern District of
Florida
8/16/07

United States District Court
for the Southern District of

Jury convicted Padilla of providing
material support to terrorists and terrorism
conspiracy

Florida
1/22/08

United States District Court
for the Southern District of
Florida

8

Sentenced to 17 years in prison

Date

Court

Decision

9/5/14

United States District Court

Re-sentenced to 21 years in prison

for the Southern District of
Florida

In 2009 President Obama publicly committed to governance by the rule of law and
constitutional values. "I took an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen, I know that we must never, ever, turn our back on its
enduring principles for expedience sake.”14 He also declared that prolonged detention should
not be left to the decision of one man, claiming it was imperative that there be a system that
involves both congressional and judicial oversite. Obama announced his intentions to close the
prison at Guantanamo Bay and in March of 2009 filed in federal District Court for the District of
Columbia that it was withdrawing the enemy combatant definition, publicly stopping the use of
the term enemy combatant.15
On December 25, 2009, Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian was apprehended in the
United States after attempting to bomb an airplane headed for Detroit, Michigan. The Obama
administration decided for Abdulmutallab to be tried in federal court:

14

Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (National Archives 2009).
Department of Justice, Department of Justice Withdraws Enemy Combatant Definition for Guantanamo
Detainees (Office of Public Affairs 2009).
15
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Table 2: Decisions in United States of America v. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab

Date

Court

1/6/10
10/12/11
2/16/12
1/13/14

Decision

United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan
United States Court of Appeals

Indictment
Abdulmutallab pleads guilty
Sentenced to four consecutive
life sentences plus 50 years
Upheld conviction

The Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations no longer
includes the term enemy combatant. However, the current administration overturned the closure
of the prison in Guantanamo Bay via Executive Order #13823.16 In his state of the Union
Address in 2018, President Trump resurrected the term unlawful enemy combatant.17 In a tweet
in March of 2018, he declared that enemy combatants were pouring into the country from
Mexico.
" Because of the $700 & $716 Billion Dollars gotten to rebuild our Military, many jobs
are created, and our Military is again rich. Building a great Border Wall, with drugs
(poison) and enemy combatants pouring into our Country, is all about National Defense.
Build WALL through M!"18

16

Executive Office of the President, Executive Order 13823 Protecting America Through Lawful Detention of
Terrorists (Office of the Federal Register 2018).
17
Donald Trump, State of the Union Address (2018), available at
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/01/30/trump-terrorists-are-unlawful-enemy-combatants-and-should-betreated-like-the-terrorists-they-are.html.
18
Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump ed., Twitter 3:33 a.m. March 25, 2018).
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Research Question
As it stands, the Executive has the power to use its discretion in determining the status of
a suspected terrorist. Even after designating a suspected terrorist, the executive can change that
status when they discover new facts about the suspected terrorist's activities, such as in the case
of Padilla. The two main issues to address in this study are how the government created and used
the term enemy combatant and how the government claimed we are at war but did not adhere to
the "laws of war" in classification and treatment for suspected terrorists.
Is the term enemy combatant an established legal category of persons under international
law? Does the president have the authority to classify a United States citizen suspected of
terrorism as an enemy combatant? In creating the term and classifying a United States citizen as
an enemy combatant, the executive is saying it has the right to make law by defining and creating
the criteria for an enemy combatant and the right to adjudicate by classifying those suspects as
enemy combatants all while claiming to adhere to U.S. laws and the laws of war.19

19

Louis Fisher, Detention and Military Trial of Suspected Terrorists: Stretching Presidential Power, 2 Journal
of National Security Law & Policy (2006).

11

Prior Research
The bulk of scholarly research on the term enemy combatant deals with whether the
president has the authority to detain those whom the government has designated as enemy
combatants, rather than whether or not the executive has the authority to classify suspected
terrorists as an enemy combatant. However, many scholars argue for the use of enemy combatant
classification based on precedence set in Ex parte Quirin and the fact that the United States is a
participant in the Global War on Terror.
Precedence for the Term Enemy Combatant
The term “unlawful combatant” was first used in 1942 in the U.S. Supreme Court case of
Ex parte Quirin. During World War II, eight Nazi spies entered the United States and after they
were detained challenged their denial of prisoner of war protections. From this case the
following precedent was given:
“By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction
between…lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and
detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants …are
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerency unlawful.”20

20

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, (Supreme Court of the United States July 31, 1942, Decided. Per Curiam
decision filed, July 31, 1942. Full Opinion filed, October 29, 1942.)

12

The court ruled 24 hours after the argument that the saboteurs could be tried via military
commission, and gave its full opinion three months later. Six of the eight saboteurs were
executed eight days after the ruling was given by the Court.21 On November 13, 2001, President
Bush issued a military order for detention and trial by military commission of non-U.S. citizens
who offer assistance to or who are a part of al Qaeda. The military order is strikingly similar to
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Proclamation 2561 from 1942. FDR's gave his proclamation
after the FBI captured the spies from the Quirin case. Both the proclamation in 1942 and 2001
required an only two-thirds vote of the military commission for conviction, and both called for a
"full and fair trial."22 In the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the Quirin case was "the most
apposite precedent that we have on the question of whether citizens may be detained in such
circumstances."23
Global War on Terror
A week after the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the AUMF but did not
"declare" war under Article I of the Constitution. This joint resolution became what the executive
would use to justify the "War on Terror legally." The key to this resolution was it stated that the
President had the authority to "deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the
United States24" Congress clearly yields to the president the first zone that Justice Jackson speaks
of in the Youngstown case: "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in

21

Stephen Dycus, et al., Counterterrorism Law (Aspen Publishers. 2007).
Louis Fisher, Detention and Military Trial of Suspected Terrorists: Stretching Presidential Power, 2 Journal
of National Security Law & Policy (2006).
23
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (Supreme Court of the United States June 28, 2004, Decided ),
24
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution 224 (2001).
22

13

his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."25 Based on this authorization many scholars
would argue that the president does have the authority to detain those suspected terrorists whom
they classified as enemy combatants. This detention could be continued through the end of the
hostilities. While the U.S. military killed Osama Bin Laden in 2011, there have been other
terrorist attacks such as the ones in Libya, Paris, San Bernardino. The threat of terrorism is still a
national security concern, and the United States finds itself in an unending war.26 With hostilities
still at bay, the argument could be made that it is in the best interest of national security to make
sure that the terrorists that are still detained should not be returned to the "battlefield." Justice
O' Connor agreed with this sentiment in the opinion outlined in Hamdi.27
With the zone of authority that the executive is acting in being explicit expresses by
Congress, there was much disagreement of executive staff such as John Yoo in the Supreme
Court "injecting" itself into military matters.28 He also argued that while al Qaeda was not a
nation-state that terrorism was a matter of war, not crime. Terrorism is an enemy, not just a tactic
and not an issue of criminal law.29 The theory that the United States is at war yields another
argument that the president is acting as Commander in Chief and within his authority to detain
enemy combatants as part of this waging war.

25

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, (Supreme Court of the United States June 2, 1952,
Decided)
26
Justin A. Thatch, The Lesser of Two Evils: Exploring the Constitutionality of Indefinite Detentions of Terror
Enemy Combatants Following the End of “Combat Operations” in Afghanistan, 24 William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal (2016).
27
Brian J. Foley, Guantanamo and Beyond: Dangers of Rigging the Rules, 97 The Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology (2007).
28
Peter Berkowitz, Terrorism, the Laws of War, and the Constitution: Debating the Enemy Combatant Cases
(Hoover Institution Press. 2005).
29

Id.
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Scholars who are against the term enemy combatant and its implications cites its
violation of due process and separation of powers.
Due Process
The Fifth Amendment states that the government may not deprive a person of liberty
without "due process of law." The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from
depriving anyone of "life, liberty, or property, without due process. The government is using the
label as "terrorist" to deprive citizens of the requirements of due process. The executive from the
outset of the war on terror had determined that enemy combatants not be privy to due process.
Justice Souter during oral arguments in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, interrupted the Solicitor General
when he tried to say the writ did not apply to enemy combatants outside the U.S. "The writ is the
writ…. There are not two writs of habeas corpus for some cases and for other cases" (Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, oral argument 59, lines 3-7). In fighting the Global War on Terror, the United States is
at risk of going against its long-standing commitment to due process.30

Separation of Powers
While not expressively written in the constitution there is a constitutional relationship
between the different branches of government. Text from the constitution that supports the
separation of power doctrine stem from the first three articles, "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,"31 "the executive Power shall be

30
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vested in a President of the United States of America,"32 and "the judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”33 In forming the government, the framers were well
aware of the danger of centralized power in a single branch.34 In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the
Supreme Court reiterated that the "framers were opposed to governments that placed in the hands
of one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the laws."35 Also in Reid v. Covert Justice
Black warned that if the Executive "can provide rules of substantive law as well as procedure,
then he and his military subordinates exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers with
respect to those subject to military trials."36
According to Justice Powell in INS v. Chada, there are ways to violate the separation of power
doctrine, "One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its
constitutionally assigned function. Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch
assumes a function that properly is entrusted in another."37
The main breach of norms in the classification of enemy combatants is that the executive
makes a decision that does not give the opportunity for judicial review.38 The argument in
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classifying a suspected terrorist as an enemy combatant that is a judicial function likened to
preventative detention. The prosecution keeps this process secret from the suspect and the
judiciary branch. This paper will use the separation of power doctrine and due process clause to
argue that the executive does not have the authority to classify suspected terrorists as enemy
combatants.
Research Approach
There is a gap in addressing the president’s authority to classify enemy combatants. A
variety of methods will be used to fill this gap and seek to answer the question of whether the
executive should have the authority to classify a U.S. citizen. This qualitative study will use
normative legal research. The normative legal research process examines legal rules, doctrines,
and principles to address the legal issue at hand in the case of classification of enemy
combatants. The focus will be on the principles of the law in classifying a U.S. citizen as an
enemy combatant as well as the legal history of the term.39 The analysis of the legal history of
the term enemy combatant will be completed by content analysis using Nvivo 12 software of
documents such as the Geneva Convention, Executive Orders, Federal Court Cases, Joint
Publication of Detainee Operations, the DTA and MCA, Army Field Manual, DOD Law of War
Publication, and Senate Floor Speeches. This software will help identify patterns of the use of
the term enemy combatant across all the different data sources and help analyze how it became
to be seen as a norm of U.S. detention policy and help identify inter-branch dialogue on the
issue.
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This study will also include as case studies the different enemy combatant cases. These
cases include Hamdi, Padilla, Rasul v. Bush, Al-Marri, Hamdan, Lindh, Moussaui, Saipov, and
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
Each case study will observe the date, background, whether the defendant is a U.S.
citizen. The analysis will also look at where they were apprehended, where their apprehension
was of military origin, if the government classified the suspect as an enemy combatant, where
the government is detaining the suspect, what charges if the government brought any charges
against the accused, and how the court ruled in each case in regards to their treatment, detention,
and status as a suspected terrorist. The case studies will also be analyzed to see if the treatment
and prosecution of suspected terrorists fall more along the spectrum of an act of war or
transnational crime.
Limitations
This study will be limited to addressing policy regarding classifying suspected terrorists
as enemy combatants regardless of where the government is detaining the suspect as well as the
nature of their alleged terrorist activities. The study will not focus on whether the president has
the authority to militarily detain a suspected terrorist once the government has classified the
suspect as an enemy combatant. The current study will also be limited it will not address the
detainees that the U.S. is still holding at the prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba or whether or not
the prison should close. The main focus is on what guidelines the United States should adhere to
when a suspect is accused of terrorism.
Description of Proposed Chapters
Chapter II will look at the origins of the term enemy combatant. Using content analysis of
various text sources the origin of the term and the frequency of use through 2018 will be
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analyzed. In a preliminary analysis, the term enemy combatant originates in statements from
George Bush in 2001 and makes its way into the DOD joint doctrine manuals on detainee
operations in 2004 and 2008. By 2014 the term enemy combatant is no longer in the detainee
operations manual and is replaced by the term belligerent.
Chapter III will briefly look at how the federal courts have ruled regarding the term
enemy combatant. This chapter will highlight the cases of Hamdi, Padilla, Rasul v. Bush,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld as well as other more recent District Court cases.
Chapter IV will look at how the separation of powers doctrine speaks to whether the
executive should have the unilateral power to classify U.S. citizens as enemy combatants.
Regardless of whether the global war on terror is an actual war, the case of Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Company v. Sawyer addresses the power of the executive. A state of war is not a “blank
check” when it comes to the rights of United States citizens. Here it will also be discussed how
the Due Process Clause is violated and how classifying as an enemy combatant can be likened to
preventative detention. In this case, the executive is acting as all three branches in establishing
the criteria, classification, and application of a suspect as an enemy combatant. It will also
present a suggestion for a codifiable policy when someone is detained as one who is accused of
terrorism that takes into consideration both the security of the United States and the individual
rights of the accused. It will also argue how having such a policy that adheres to the values of
human rights will help the United States strengthen its National Security.
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF THE TERM ENEMY COMBATANT
Introduction
To argue whether or not the executive has the authority to classify a United States citizen
as an enemy combatant, we first must understand where the term came from and whether or not
it differs from precedence. The following chapter will look at how the term “enemy combatant”
first started to be used by the United States government and how it evolved to its present-day
use.
History of the Term Enemy Combatant Pre-9/11
“I, GEORGE W. BUSH, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of
the U.S. armed forces, hereby DETERMINE for the United States of America that: (1)
Jose Padilla, who is under the control of the Department of Justice and who is a U.S.
citizen, is, and at the time he entered the United States in May 2002 was, an enemy
combatant…it is REDACTED consistent with U.S. law and the laws of war for the
Secretary of Defense to detain Mr. Padilla as enemy combatant.”40
One would assume that based on this quote from President George W. Bush that the
classification of enemy combatant is, in fact, a part of an established term in international law.
However, as the next section will show that all uses of the term enemy combatant before 9/11 in
published case law were inconsistent in who and where they were applied. Leading up to this
designation of Jose Padilla there were only two types of combatants established in international
law, lawful combatants (those who were entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions)
and unlawful combatants (those who were not entitled to POW status.)
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Use of the term Enemy Combatant in ex parte Quirin
The term enemy combatant was used only once in the Supreme Court case Ex Parte Quirin in
1942.
“The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in
time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the
purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of
belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war,
but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals.”41

The use in Quirin is against a clearly defined enemy (Germany) with a clearly defined conflict
(WWII). In the one sentence that it the term is used, the court is addressing the question of
whether or not the president has authority to try these spies via a military tribunal because of the
violations of the laws of war. The government applied the term enemy combatant to non-citizens
and one naturalized citizen. Throughout the opinion, the terms "unlawful combatant," "enemy
belligerent," and "enemy combatant" seemed to be used interchangeably as a descriptive term for
those spies who had violated the laws of war. The terms "enemy belligerent" and "unlawful
combatant" appear more than ten times. The opinion would offer up a definition for the term
"unlawful combatant."
“By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the
armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those
who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and
detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition, they are subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.”42
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In the main holding whether or not the government could try the spies by military
tribunal did not depend on how the term "enemy combatant" was used or how it was defined. It
is interesting to note that the term "unlawful combatant" become an established term in
international law as it is referred to in the 1949 Geneva Convention.
Use of the term Enemy Combatant in Yamashita and other case law
Between 1946 and 2001 the term "enemy combatant" was used in varied contexts in
seven different cases. In re Yamashita, the court addressed the question as to whether or not there
was the authority to try the captured Commanding General of the Japanese Army on the
Philippine Islands after the hostilities had ended. The term "enemy combatant'” was used 11
times describing those foreign captured soldiers who had violated the laws of war.43
“The trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have committed violations of the
law of war is thus not only a part of the conduct of war operating as a preventive measure
against such violations, but is an exercise of the authority sanctioned by Congress to
administer the system of military justice recognized by the law of war.”44
This case did not give a formal definition to the term enemy combatant, and the government
applied the term to a non-citizen who was a member of a part of an armed force that the United
States had declared war. In Madison v. Kinsella the term "enemy combatant" was used from a
quote from the decision in Yamashita, "by thus recognizing military commissions in order to
preserve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the Articles,
Congress gave sanction as we held in Ex Parte Quirin, to any use of military commission
contemplated by the common law of war." Madsen was a widow who was charged by the
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German government with killing her husband in 1949 violating Germany's criminal code. The
court allowed the German military tribunal to try Madsen for killing her husband. There is no
mention of the term "enemy combatant" in case law between 1952 and 1991.
In the Court of Military Review, the term enemy combatant is used in three cases
between 1991-2001. In U.S. v. Peri, U.S. v. Rankins, and U.S. v. McMonagle “enemy combatant”
is used as a descriptive term for enemy fighters or soldiers.45 The uses of the term “enemy
combatant” in case law prior to September 11, 2001, in no way, establishes uniform meaning or
legal significance. In each instance, the government used the term enemy combatant to apply to
different circumstances that in do not set a precedent to how it was used in the application of
those who were accused of terrorism after the September 11th attacks.
History of the Term Enemy Combatant Post-9/11
After the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the first time the term
"enemy combatant" appears is in a Chicago Law Bulletin titled, "Rules of Engagement."
Referring to the attacks, “last week’s terrorism was not a crime but an act of war, its perpetrators
are not criminals to be prosecuted but enemy combatants to be shot”46 Nowhere does it appear to
be used by the government or in case law until February 2002 in the case Coalition of Clergy v.
Bush.47 The case was a habeas petition to identify the detainees that the government was holding
in Guantanamo Bay. The court ruled plaintiffs did not have standing.
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“In all key respects, the Guantanamo detainees are like the petitioners in Johnson: They
are aliens; they were enemy combatants; they were captured in combat; they were abroad
when captured; they are abroad now; since their capture, they have been under the control
of only the military; they have not stepped foot on American soil; and there are no legal
or judicial precedents entitling them to pursue a writ of habeas corpus in an American
civilian court.”48
Judge Matz notes that the detainees were “aliens” and “enemy combatants.” In all filed
documents and arguments the government used the term “enemy aliens” to refer to those whom
the U.S. government was holding at Guantanamo Bay, not “enemy combatants.” In the opinion,
Judge Matz does not address anything about the designation of the detainees just that they had no
standing to seek the writ.

The first time the government uses the term in on March 21, 2002. William Lietzau,
Special Advisor to the General Counsel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was helping
Paul Wolfowitz prepare for an interview on the United States detention policy. According to
Lietzau, there was the discussion that it would be wise to stop using the term "unlawful
combatant" so frequently because it suggested there was already judgment as to the detainee's
guilt. The United States was holding detainees because they were enemies, not because they
were criminals. When Wolfowitz inquired as to what other terms could be used Lietzau
answered that perhaps he should use enemy combatant:
“because it then designates them with the appropriate adjective to describe why we’re
holding them. We’re holding them because they’re the enemy not because they’ve done
something unlawful. A lawful combatant or an unlawful combatant can be held just as
well.”49
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After the meeting, Lietzau ran the term by the Deputy General Counsel for International
Affairs, Chuck Allen, and to General Counsel to the Department of Defense, William Haynes
and they all agreed that it should be the term that the government should use. It was not until
after Lietzau brought up the term to this group that it the DOD found it in Quirin. The executive
cited Quirin as both the "origin and the justification for the use of the term enemy combatant,
happened after the term was adopted. Quirin was a post hoc rationalization." Lietzau stated in an
interview, "I'd like to say I was so well-versed in Quirin that I pulled it directly from the case,
but no. It was logic. It was the English language. I was thinking in terms of what the American
people would understand." While it was intended to be a descriptive term at the outset of its
introduction, it evolved into something much more.
Later on that day on the PBS News Hour, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
agreed to be interviewed to discuss the rules governing military tribunals.
“I think it's important to recognize that the people who are in Guantanamo are there
because they're enemy combatants seized in a war, a war on terrorism. Most of them
probably– I don't know the exact legal term, but they are not normal combatants in a
sense of being in uniform. There’s a lot that's very unique about this conflict. Some of
them are in fact criminals. They're not only enemy combatants, they're people who are
guilty of being involved probably or possibly in serious crimes of terrorism.”50
In this interview, the term enemy combatant is used to address detainees that the
government seized in the war on terrorism. Wolfowitz even after receiving coaching from
Lietzau is not clear on what the legal term is for those held in Guantanamo. If they are not the
usual combatants in the sense of being in uniform, then one could assume they were unlawful
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combatants. It is confusing how he declares the detainees could be both criminals and enemy
combatants.
That same day in a Pentagon briefing General Counsel to the Department of Defense
William Haynes used the term enemy combatant, “we may hold enemy combatants for the
duration of the conflict,” to which he added even if the enemy combatants were tried and
acquitted in a military tribunal.51
On June 8, 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel published a
memo giving their opinion to the Attorney General as to whether Jose Padilla qualified as an
enemy combatant “under the laws of armed conflict.”52 The memo claimed that the President has
authority as Commander in Chief to seize and detain “enemy combatants” beyond uncertainty. It
also goes on to argue that “this authority to seize enemy combatants has been exercised in
conflicts throughout the history of the Nation, from the time of the Founding to the
present.”53Then the memo continues to quote Jefferson Davis "have been heretofore and are yet
held as prisoners of war.” The next day President George W. Bush signed the order to officially
designating Padilla as an enemy combatant, claiming it was consistent with the law of war.54
In June and July, different members of the executive branch began to use the term enemy
combatant freely. June 12, 2002, Deputy Commander of the Joint Task Force in Guantanamo
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identifies Hamdi as an enemy combatant. In July 2002, Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the
Under Secretary of Defense for policy also identified Hamdi as an enemy combatant. On July 15,
2002, in the United States Report to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), "[t]he unchallenged state practice of detaining enemy combatants in time of armed
conflict was not subject to review by the Commission."55 DOD issued on July 17, 2002, "News
About the War on Terrorism," featuring a member of the Coast Guard whose job it was to "patrol
waters around Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to support Joint Task Force 160." The Joint Task Force
was "a multiservice command in charge of detention operations here of captured enemy
combatants.”56
After the summer of 2002, Congress started to question this expansion of executive
authority in detaining United States citizens. In September, the Armed Services Committee
Chairman Senator Carl Levin and Judiciary subcommittee Chairman Senator Russ Feingold sent
a letter demanded information on why the government was detaining two United States citizens
(Hamdi and Padilla) as "enemy combatants." The letter also admonished Attorney General John
Ashcroft for ignoring their five earlier congressional inquiries. Some of the questions asked in
the letter were:
"What is the operative definition of 'enemy combatant' and what are the criteria used to
determine whether a United States citizen will be designated an enemy combatant?
"What is the process for designating a person an "enemy combatant"? What agency or
individual has the responsibility to make such a designation? Is the ultimate authority to
designate a United States citizen as an enemy combatant reserved for the president?
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"Do the criteria for determining enemy combatant status vary depending upon whether
an individual is a citizen of the United States? Do the criteria vary if the person is taken into
custody outside the United States? Do they vary if the person is taken into custody on the
battlefield?
What rights does a United States citizen designated as an enemy combatant have to
challenge that designation other than the right to habeas corpus review? What is the scope of the
detainee's right to counsel if the detainee seeks to challenge the enemy combatant designation?
What are the time limits on the government's authority to detain United States citizens
designated as enemy combatants?
Are any other U.S. citizens besides Hamdi and Padilla being held as enemy
combatants?”57
On November 26, 2002, Haynes responded to the letter from Senator Carl Levin and Senator
Russ Feingold inquiring as to the designation of enemy combatants. Haynes writes that the
operative definition of enemy combatant "is an individual who, under the laws and customs of
war, may be detained for the duration of the armed conflict. "[t]he United States may detain
enemy combatants throughout the conflict (and thereafter if they are convicted of war crimes or
other criminal offenses)." Again in December of 2002 Haynes then says, '"Enemy Combatant' is
a general category that subsumes two sub-categories: lawful and unlawful combatants. See
Quirin. He then indicates that the President has determined that al Qaeda members and Taliban
detainees are "unlawful combatants “who "do not receive POW status and do not receive the full
protections of the Third Geneva Convention."58 This is a confusing clarification. In referring to
al Qaeda and Taliban detainees as unlawful, Haynes is allowing the possibility that some of the
enemy combatants could be lawful combatants (which would make them entitled to POW
status.)
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In October of 2002 a bill was introduced in Congress titled the Detention of Enemy
Combatants Act, HR 5684.59 It sought to give “broad latitude” to the Executive in regards to the
detention of enemy combatants.
“The term “enemy combatant” has historically referred to all of the citizens of a state
with which the Nation is at war, and who are members of the armed force of that enemy
state. Enemy combatants in the present conflict, however, come from many nations,
wear no uniforms, and use unconventional weapons. Enemy combatants in the war on
terrorism are not defined by simple, readily apparent criteria, such as citizenship or
military uniform. And the power to name a citizen as an “enemy combatant” is therefore
extraordinarily broad.”
Here it seems as if Congress is applying the term enemy combatant for both lawful combatants
(members of an armed force of an enemy state) and unlawful combatants (wear no uniforms).
The Geneva Conventions clearly state what category a person is in when they do not wear a
uniform. It is not clear as to why extraordinarily broad power is necessary to be delegated to the
President by Congress. However, this bill was only authorizing the executive to detain those
enemy combatants that were members of al-Qaeda. The bill goes on to also say,
“Nothing in this Act permits the Government, even in wartime, to detain American
citizens or other persons lawfully in the United States as enemy combatants indefinitely
without charges and hold them incommunicado without a hearing and without access to
counsel on the basis of a unilateral determination that the person may be connected with
an organization that intends harm to the United States… The Congress has a
responsibility for maintaining vigorous oversight of detention of United States citizens
and lawful residents to assure that such detentions are consistent with due process.”
This bill never made it to a committee, but one can infer that if Congress proposed
legislation to give authority to the executive, then that authority was not there before Congress
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gave it. Another critical thing to note was that this proposed legislation had an expiration date of
December 5, 2005, in Congress’ eyes detention was not meant to be indefinite.
By 2004 federal courts were weighing in on cases that had the term enemy combatant.
The following chapter discusses the details and backgrounds of each case. This chapter will
focus solely on the evolution and use of the term enemy combatant in these court cases. In the
Hamdi case, the court used the following definition of enemy combatant when it was ruling on
the authority of the executive to detain. [F]or purposes of this case, the "enemy combatant" that it
[the United States] is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was "part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and who "engaged in
armed conflict against the United States" there."60
Even though the government was using the term enemy combatant from the beginning of
2002, it did not appear in published military operation manuals until 2004. In the Joint
Publication 2-01 Military Doctrine Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military
Operations. In the responsibilities section, it describes, "[s]service component interrogators
collect tactical intelligence from EPWs [Enemy POWs] and ECs [enemy combatants] based on
joint force J-2 criteria." The manual lists two categories of detainees listed EPW's are "lawful
combatants" and ECs are "unlawful combatants." The glossary section contains the following EC
= "[a]ny person in an armed conflict who could be properly detained under the laws and customs
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of war." The field manual was inconsistent with what the government rhetoric up until this point.
This definition could include both lawful and unlawful.
In March of 2005 the Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations (JP 3-63) created a new
category of detainee, "Following the events of September 11, 2001, a new category of detainee,
enemy combatant (EC), was created for personnel who are not granted or entitled to the
privileges of the Geneva Convention”[citation] it goes on to say in regards to detainees:
“Any person that US or allied forces could properly detain under the laws and customs of
war. For purposes of the war on terror, an enemy combatant includes, but is not
necessarily limited to, a member or agent of Al Qaeda, Taliban, or another international
terrorist organization against which [the] United States is engaged in an armed conflict.
This may include those individuals or entities designated in accordance with references E
or G, as identified in applicable Executive Orders approved by the Secretary”(insert
citation)
In this operations manual, the four categories of detainees that are protected under the Geneva
Conventions are an Enemy Prisoner of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Persons, and Other
Detainees. It goes on to describe an "additional classification of enemy combatant.
"[i]n reference to the Global War on Terror there is an additional classification of
detainees who, through their own conduct, are not entitled to the privileges and
protections of the Geneva Conventions. These personnel, when detained, are classified as
enemy combatants."
The JP 3-63 contradicts itself in saying that an enemy combatant is a type of detainee that the
government can properly detain under the law and customs of war, yet it then says that an enemy
combatant is a new category of a detainee that is not entitled to the privileges of the Geneva
Convention. Moving on to the detainee classification section, the definition of enemy combatant
is solely by reference to Executive Order 13224, which applies to "anyone detained that is
affiliated with [terrorists and terrorist groups identified under this order]"(citation) It further
classifies enemy combatants into five sub-categories including Low-Level Enemy Combatant,
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High-Value Detainee, Criminal Detainee, High-Value Criminal, and Security Detainee. In the
glossary of JP 3-63 defines enemy combatant as "any person in an armed conflict who could be
properly detained under the laws and customs of war. Also called EC."
In the Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee Against
Torture dated May 6, 2005, the government used enemy combatant and unprivileged combatant
interchangeably. This stance reverts to an earlier declaration that an enemy combatant is the
same as an unlawful or unprivileged combatant.
“After the President's decision [not to grant POW status to the Taliban and al Qaeda
detainees] the United States concluded that those who are part of al-Qaeda, the Taliban or
their affiliates and supporters, or support such forces are enemy combatants whom we
may detain for the duration of hostilities; these unprivileged combatants do not enjoy the
privileges of POWs (i.e., privileged combatants) under the Third Geneva Convention.”
This definition is inconsistent with DOD definitions in JP 3-63 and Haynes definition in
December of 2002.
For the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), which were created in response to
the rulings in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush, the term enemy combatant, was defined:
“'enemy combatant' shall mean an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States
or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or
has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

Under the Geneva Conventions, a person that commits a belligerent act can either be lawful or
unlawful, so this could include lawful combatants who are entitled to POW status. The CSRT is
inconsistent with Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention which “requires that a competent
tribunal make the decision as to stats. The decision making power of the CSRT panel members
are limited to whether the detainees are enemy combatants. The panel members are not given
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authority to determine whether any of the detainees are lawful combatants and therefore
protected by POW status.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Justice Stevens applied the government’s definition of enemy
combatants to those detainees that were being held in Guantanamo, "[a]n 'enemy combatant' is
defined by the military order as 'an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.”61 Later that year in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA 2006) enemy
combatant is defined as an unlawful enemy combatant:
"(1) Unlawful enemy combatant.--(A) The term unlawful enemy combatant' means-- "(i)
a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy
combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces);
or "(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the
authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.”62
The MCA differentiates between “unlawful enemy combatant” and “lawful enemy combatant.”
A lawful enemy combatant is a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in
hostilities against the United States.” At first glance, it may seem that Congress is reiterating
classifications of persons that are included in the Geneva Conventions. However, it also states
that no “unlawful enemy combatant” may “invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights.”63 The MCA in 2006 amended the Title X 948(a) to include this definition of “unlawful
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enemy combatant. In 2009 948a was amended again. The terms "unlawful enemy combatant"
and "lawful enemy combatant" were replaced with "unprivileged enemy belligerent" and
"privileged belligerent.”64 In Title X 948c “alien unprivileged enemy belligerents” are subject to
military commissions.
In Boumediene v. Bush, the court “delegated the decision as to which definition of enemy
combatant should govern those proceedings.”65 The government did not use the definition that
was adopted by the MCA, it mimicked the definition used in Hamdan, “an "enemy combatant" is
an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”66
In the spring of 2009, the Department of Justice under the Obama administration issued a
memo with a distinct change in policy regarding the term enemy combatant. “It provides that
individuals who supported al Qaeda or the Taliban are detainable only if the support was
substantial. Moreover, it does not employ the phrase "enemy combatant."67 The memo states
clearly that the president’s authorization does not come from the authority as Commander-inChief separate from Congress' authorization. The goal was to develop a new policy regarding the
detainees that fell in line with American values, strengthen national security, and governed by
law.68
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Something interesting that was found during the content analysis using Nvivo was
proposed legislation H.R. 4415 from 2010. “To amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize
the President to determine that certain individual are unlawful enemy combatants subject to trial
by military commissions, and for other purposes.” The fact that this bill seeks to give
authorization to the president to classify enemy combatant could mean that the authorization is
not there. This bill never made it past committee. However the definitions changed in title 10 in
2009 to enemy belligerent, so it is confusing why the proposed legislation was worded in this
way.
The evolution of the term enemy combatant continues to this day. As discussed in chapter
one, regarding the suspected terrorist in October of 2017 there was dialogue as to the fact that
Saipov should be declared an enemy combatant. There were calls for the suspect to be
interrogated as an enemy combatant consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict.
In the State of the Union address in 2018, President Donald Trump declared, “Terrorists
are not merely criminals, they are unlawful enemy combatants.” Trump also has tweeted that
enemy combatants are pouring over the border from Mexico. Most recently a U.S. citizen was
declared by the Pentagon to be an enemy combatant and held for 13 months without charges
being filed.
As shown in the table below the definition and use of the term enemy combatant is
inconsistent in both its definition and how it applied. Even though it is no longer in Title X of the
U.S. code, the term enemy combatant is still being used by both members of Congress and the
Executive branch. Before 9/11 the term was used as a descriptive term and used interchangeably
with the term "unlawful combatant." There was no international meaning before the government
began using it after the attacks in 2001.
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Table 3: History of the Use of Enemy Combatant Post 9/11
Date
Source
Use
2/2002

Coalition of Clergy v. Bush

3/2002

Lietzau, General Counsel DOD

3/2002

Wolfowitz, DOD

3/2002

Haynes, General Counsel DOD

6/2002

Jay S. Bybee DOJ OLC

6/2002

George W. Bush

enemy combatants; they were captured in
combat; they were abroad when captured
Appropriate adjective to describe why we're
holding them. We're holding them because they're
the enemy not because they've done something
unlawful.
On the detainees in Guantanamo- enemy
combatants seized in a war, a war on terrorism
“We may hold enemy combatants for the
duration of the conflict”
Padilla qualifies as an enemy combatant under
the laws of armed conflict.
Designates Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant.

6/2002

Deputy Commander of the JTF in Designates Hamdi as an enemy combatant.
Guantanamo
7/2002 Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor Also designates Hamdi as an enemy combatant.
to the Under Secretary of
Defense
7/2002 U.S. report to IACHR
Detaining enemy combatants is not subject to
review by the commission.
7/2002 DOD
Described detainees being held at Guantanamo as
enemy combatants.
9/2002 Levin & Feingold, Senate
Questioned the detention of American citizens as
enemy combatants.
10/2002 Proposed Legislation HR 5684
Enemy combatant that are U.S. citizens can only
be detained if they are members of or supported
al-Qaeda
11/2002 Haynes, General Counsel DOD
Enemy combatants can be held throughout the
conflict
12/2002 Haynes, General Counsel DOD
Enemy combatants include sub-categories of
lawful and unlawful combatants
2004
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Enemy combatant is a part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners who engaged in armed conflict against
the United States
2004
JP 2-01
Enemy combatant any person in an armed
conflict who could properly be detained under the
laws and customs and war
2004
CSRT
Enemy combatant individual who was part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
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Date

Source

2005

JP 3-63

5/2005

Report to CAT

2006

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

2006

MCA

2008

Boumediene v. Bush

2009

Title X 948a

2009

Department of Justice

2010

Proposed Legislation H.R. 4415

2017

Senator John McCain

2018

President Donald Trump

2018

Pentagon

Use
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition
partners
Enemy Combatant is a new category of detainee
who is not privy to Geneva Convention
protections
Any person who could properly be detained under
the laws and customs of war
'an individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition
partners
Changed to “unlawful enemy combatant” a
person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities
against the United States or its co-belligerents
who is not a lawful enemy combatant
Uses the same definition as Hamdan
“unlawful enemy combatant” changed to
“unprivileged enemy belligerent”
Withdraws enemy combatant definition for
Guantanamo Detainees
authorize the President to determine that certain
individuals are unlawful enemy combatants
Suspected terrorist should be interrogated as an
enemy combatant consistent with the Law of
Armed Conflict. Does not have Miranda Rights
Terrorists are enemy combatants; they are pouring
over the Mexican border
Declares U.S. citizen an enemy combatant and
held for 13 months.
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CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDIES
Introduction
Each of the following cases will investigate court rulings in reference to the term enemy
combatant. Through the use of Nvivo 12 this paper will analyze the pattern of use and the level
inter-branch dialogue. Each case study will observe include the general background of the court
case as well as how the term enemy combatant is used. The term “enemy combatant” was coded
in the documents in the following contexts:
Unlawful

Law of war

Al-Qaeda

Lawful

Torture

Battlefield

Alien

Strikes

Military Commission

Unprivileged

Geneva Convention

Due Process

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
Background
Hamdi was detained during military action against the Taliban by the United States in
Afghanistan. The government declared him an enemy combatant, the only “due process”
afforded Hamdi was the screening process (which was unspecified) and military interrogations.
In 2002 Hamdi was transferred to a U.S. Naval brig in Virginia. Hamdi’s father filed a habeas
corpus petition alleging that the government was improperly holding Hamdi without access to
legal counsel or informing of what charges were being held against him. Hamdi’s father also
claimed that Hamdi had gone to Afghanistan to do relief work, and could not have been
militarily trained. Hamdi asserts that he had been trapped in Afghanistan once the military
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conflict began.69 In both Hamdi and a subsequent case discussed later, Padilla, the government
asserts that the United States was at war with terrorist organizations and the executive had
unreviewable discretion under his war power to detain suspected of harboring, supporting or
associating with those terrorist organizations (Taliban or al-Qaeda). The Supreme Court’s main
task was to determine whether the executive had the authority to detain a U.S. citizen as an
enemy combatant. With four different opinions and no majority, the Court held that the AUMF
did authorize the executive branch to detain a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant. However,
Hamdi did have the right to due process that would allow him the opportunity to rebut that he
was an enemy combatant.70 Hamdi after denouncing his U.S. citizenship was released in Saudi
Arabia.71
Use of the Term Enemy Combatant in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
As stated in the prior chapter, the Court determined what definition they would use for
enemy combatant: “those who are a part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or
coalition partners" in Afghanistan, and who "engaged in armed conflict against the United
States" there."72 In finding that the executive had the authority to detain an “enemy combatant”,
“The plurality, however, qualifies its recognition of the President's authority to detain
enemy combatants in the war on terrorism in ways that are at odds with our precedent.
Thus, the plurality relies primarily on Article118 of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S. T. 3406, T. I. A. S.
No. 3364.”73
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If this is the perspective of the judicial branch on matters of the treatment and detention of
enemy combatants it makes sense why they are hesitant to weigh in. The lower courts made clear
that there is a distinct separation of powers in military affairs. In the Fourth Circuit decision,
“Indeed, Articles I and II prominently assign to Congress and the President the shared
responsibility for military affairs. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2. In accordance with this
constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political branches when
called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or
military affairs”74
In another Fourth Circuit ruling,
“No evidentiary hearing or factual inquiry was necessary because Hamdi was captured in
active combat zone in a foreign country. The Defense Department can detain Hamdi via
the Executives war powers from the constitution stemming from the AUMF against al
Qaeda (316 F.3d at 463) Because no charges have been brought Hamdi has no need or
write to counsel (475) Same as Territo75 A U.S. Citizen captured with enemy forces can
be detained until the hostilities cease. (See In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 147)76

Article III courts in the Hamdi case defer to both the executive and legislative because
they see enemy combatant under the guise of a prisoner of war under the Geneva Conventions.
In the plurality decision, there is also discussion that reveals the justices’ understanding “based
on longstanding law-of-war principles.” They go on to say, “If the practical circumstances of a
given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law
of war, that understanding may unravel.”77 Based on this statement, any other circumstance of a
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suspected terrorist not apprehended during active combat operations on the battlefield, the
executive would not have the same authority.
Thomas in his dissent in the Supreme Court opinion stated that the President and
Congress, not the courts should decide the appropriate means of determining enemy combatant
status and exercise their respective war powers. In Scalia’s dissent, he argues the law of war does
not apply to citizens when the courts are open.78 Justice Scalia also argues that the “our
constitutional tradition has been to prosecute [U.S. citizens accused of waging war against the
government] in federal court for treason or some other crime.”79 His stance is that Hamdi’s
detention is unconstitutional if the Writ was not properly suspended.
While their ruling was limited to authority to detain American citizens, the plurality
opinion and dissent both reveal that in analyzing the issue before them, the court is leery of the
executive detaining for the sake of detaining (or interrogating) without seeking to punish wrong.
The justices also make it clear that Hamdi in their eyes is considered a prisoner of war, not a
separate category of person as an enemy combatant.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)
Background

Rumsfeld v. Padilla was another habeas challenge brought before the Supreme Court.
Jose Padilla was taken into custody on U.S. soil as a material witness issued by the Justice
Department for being allegedly being involved in a plot by al Qaeda to detonate a “dirty bomb.”
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In June of 2002, Padilla was designated by Bush as an enemy combatant and transferred to
military custody. Padilla argued this detention violated 18 U.S.C. §4001(a), the Non-Detention
Act “no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the U.S. except pursuant to an Act
of Congress.”80 The Court ruled that the habeas petition was not filed in the proper venue. They
did not decide on the merits of whether the President had the authority to detain U.S. citizens
apprehended or captured on American soil. However, four justices would have affirmed that the
detention is prohibited under the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) (prohibiting the
detention of U.S. citizens unless authorized by an act of Congress).81

Use of the Term Enemy Combatant in Rumsfeld v. Padilla

One of the early rulings in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
summarized the issue at hand. “The central issue presented in this case: whether the President
has the authority to designate as an unlawful combatant an American citizen, captured on
American soil, and to detain him without trial.”82 Unfortunately, because of the jurisdiction
issue, the central issue was never addressed in the Supreme Court.
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Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
Background
The Rasul case was different from Hamdi and Padilla in that the petitioners were not
U.S. citizens, four of them were British citizens, and one was an Australian citizen. The military
captured the suspects in Afghanistan during the armed conflict. The detainees then were
transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Their families filed a habeas corpus petitions citing that
the detainees' Fifth Amendment due process rights were being violated by their indefinite
detentions and their denial to access to a lawyer. It is important to note that the detainees, in this
case, are not nationals of countries that the United States was at war. They were not given the
outlet in any court or tribunal to deny that they were engaged in or plotted acts of aggression
against the United States. The court ruled 6-3 that based on the federal habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. §2241 that federal courts could consider habeas corpus petitions from (or on behalf of)
persons who are detained on at the U.S Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The
government argued that the courts did not have jurisdiction based on the location of the U.S.
Naval Station, they failed to argue that under the executive's constitutional war powers, the court
would not have jurisdiction. There had been multiple opinions during the Hamdi case that stated
that Congress and the Executive shared war powers, not the court. The Court did not address the
non-citizens burden of proof.
Use of the Term Enemy Combatant in Rasul v. Bush
The term "enemy combatant" is used zero times in the published Supreme Court decision.
The government did not argue that the military was detaining the petitioners because they were
enemy combatants. The country of citizenship (Britain and Australia) could be the reason that
the government showed restraint in this case, but then the government has no issue declaring
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United States citizens enemy combatants. However, decisions in both Hamdi and Rasul limited
but calculated check on the expansion of executive power and reaffirmation of the judicial role in
protecting individual rights even in times of national emergency.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)
Background
The petitioner in Hamdan was a Yemeni national who was also Osama Bin Laden's
driver and an active participant in al Qaeda. Hamdan was apprehended in Afghanistan and was
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and classified by the DOD as an enemy combatant. He filed for a
writ of habeas corpus and challenged how the executive branch sought to prosecute him for
conspiracy to commit offenses that violated the laws of war. The offenses that the government
accused Hamdan of conspiring were to attack civilians, destruction of civil property, terrorism,
and delivery of weapons to al Qaeda training camps. The court held that the military tribunals
did not comply with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or the law of war. The Court
also held that Common Article 3 did apply to detainees captured in the conflict with al Qaeda.
This ruling gave the detainees a minimum amount of protections such as "the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounce by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples." The plurality also concluded that conspiracy to violate the
law of war was not a crime under the law of war or the UCMJ.83
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Use of the Term Enemy Combatant in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
The government uses the term enemy combatant interchangeably in its argument in the
Hamdan case:
“The common law of war establishes that Hamdan's willful and knowing membership in
al Qaeda is a war crime chargeable before a military commission. Hamdan, a confirmed
enemy combatant and member or affiliate of al Qaeda, has been charged with willfully
and knowingly joining a group (al Qaeda) whose purpose is "to support violent attacks
against property and nationals (both military and civilian) of the United States." Id., at
64a; 344 F. Supp.2d, at 161. Moreover, the allegations specify that Hamdan joined and
maintained his relationship with al Qaeda even though he "believed that Usama bin
Laden and his associates were involved in the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania in August 1998, the attack on the USS COLE in October 2000, and the
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001." App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a. These
allegations, against a confirmed unlawful combatant, are alone sufficient to sustain the
jurisdiction of Hamdan's military commission.”84
The Court does not examine the term enemy combatant and could have ruled that the
term did not exist as a term in international or constitutional law. They could have addressed that
the executive that the administration could not lawfully designate someone as an enemy
combatant, and that the executive must follow international and constitutional law and norms
when speaking to the issue of conspiracy to commit acts of war not being a crime under the law
of war. The justices did speak to the separation of powers issue in regards to enemy combatants.
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer expressed concern that trying crimes via military
commissions would make it possible for the executive and its officials to define, prosecute, and
adjudicate without independent review. The three-part system of the Constitution was designed
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to avoid this. They were also concerned that “the government claimed authority to continue to
detain him on the basis of his status as an enemy combatant.”85
Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008)
Background
The principal petitioner in Boumediene v. Bush was a native Algerian who was
apprehended by military officials in Bosnia in 2002. The government suspected Boumediene and
five others of plotting to bomb the United States Embassy in Bosnia. The petitioners were
designated enemy combatants and were held at the United States Naval Station in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. Congress passed the Military Commissions Act in 2006 in an attempt to bar Article
III courts from hearing habeas corpus applications. However, the MCA did not suspend the writ,
and the Suspension Clause still applied in Guantanamo Bay.86
The Court ruled that the constitutional writ of habeas extends to non-citizens and that the
federal government is subject to the constitution even when it acts outside of U.S. borders. The
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 does not provide procedures that are adequate replacements for
a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the MCA is an unconstitutional violation of the Suspension
Clause. The court’s ruling points to the essence of the dilemma in classifying suspected terrorists
as enemy combatants. “The Court therefore agrees with petitioners that there is considerable risk
of error in the tribunal's findings of fact. And given that the consequence of error may be
detention for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk is too
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significant to ignore.”87Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent was highly critical of Justice
Kennedy’s for not ruling on whether the CSRTs violated due process.
Use of the Term Enemy Combatant in Boumediene v. Bush
The term “enemy combatant” is used multiple times in Boumediene. The Executive
branch designated the petitioners as enemy combatants. In this case, enemy combatant was used
as the petitioners’ status.
“In deciding the constitutional questions now presented we must determine whether
petitioners are barred from seeking the writ or invoking the protections of the Suspension
Clause either because of their status, i.e., petitioners' designation by the Executive Branch
as enemy combatants, or their physical location, i.e., their presence at Guantanamo
Bay.88

We can glean from the follow up federal district court ruling by Judge Richard J. Leon in
the use of the term enemy combatant. Here Judge Leon ruled that the court would use the CSRT
definition for the term enemy combatant.
“An “enemy combatant” is an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy forces.”89
In the Boumediene v. Bush case before the District Court for the District of Columbia the
government argued that petitioners are lawfully detained because they are "enemy combatants,"
who can be held pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force and the President's
powers as Commander in Chief. The government also argued that the petitioners planned to
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travel to Afghanistan (Government dropped the issue of the plan to bomb the embassy which is
why they were originally detained.) Judge Leon ordered their release because there was just one
source of evidence (that was classified from and unnamed source).90
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009)
Background
Even though the judiciary dismissed this case before arguments were heard in the
Supreme Court, the al-Marri case is an excellent example of the challenges posed because there
is not a consistent way to prosecute suspected terrorists. Al-Marri was a Qatari citizen who was
legally admitted into the United States. In 2001 he was arrested by civilian law enforcement for
being involved in the September 11th attacks. In February 2002 and January 2003 he was
charged with possessing counterfeit credit card numbers, making false statements to the FBI,
lying on a bank application. Al-Marri plead not-guilty. Right before his trial the government
dismissed the criminal charges and the President designated al-Marri as an enemy combatant.
The government held al-Marri in military custody in a Naval brig off the coast of South Carolina.
Use of the Term Enemy Combatant in the al-Marri Cases
The question that the Fourth District Court sought to answer was whether the AUMF and
the law of war permitted the detention of a resident alien who had the government accused of
aiding al Qaeda, not on the Afghanistan battlefield but United States' soil. Four judges believed
that al-Marri did not fit the legal category of "enemy combatant" from Hamdi. They felt that the
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government must either charge him with a crime, deport him, or get a material witness warrant
for the grand jury proceedings. The judges did not agree on a common definition in this case.
They did find that the AUMF gave the President to detain "sleeper agents" on behalf of al Qaeda.
The case was remanded to the district court to determine if the government had given enough
evidence that al-Marri was, in fact, was a sleeper agent. Another important consideration of the
en banc panel was how much of an evidentiary burden the government would need to detain alMarri. Judge Traxler stated that there was an error in the lower court in applying the relaxed
evidentiary standards of Hamdi when it is a suspect that the government apprehends in the
United States.
“Hamdi does not, however, provide a cookie-cutter procedure appropriate for every
alleged enemy-combatant, regardless of the circumstances of the alleged combatant's seizure or
the actual burdens the government might face in defending the habeas petition in the normal
way. Al-Marri clearly stands in a much different position from Hamdi. He was not captured
bearing arms on the battlefield of Afghanistan, but was arrested within the United States by the
FBI…”91
Al-Marri did not fit within “limited category” from Hamdi. His detention was not “necessary and
appropriate force. ” In Hamdi the reasoning was to “prevent a combatant’s return to
battlefield.”92
The al-Marri case reveals a few issues. First, there is no agreed-upon definition or
circumstances for an enemy combatant. Second, the fate of those who are suspected terrorists or
"enemy combatants" get bounced around the federal court system. Third, in al-Marri, there is a
clear distinction that there is a difference in a person who is picked up "on the battlefield" and
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one whom the government apprehends in the United States. Lastly, al-Marri was first criminally
charged. Then the government dropped those charges in favor of declaring him an enemy
combatant. After that, the government decided to drop that distinction and again charge al-Marri
criminally. The inconsistency on how the Executive uses the term enemy combatant calls into
question whether it has the authority to use it in the first place.
Civilian Justice System
John Walker Lindh
John Walker Lindh was a U.S. citizen who joined the Taliban and fought against the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. The United States' government apprehended Lindh and placed
him into military custody at the same time and place as Hamdi. While in custody he had no
contact with lawyers for over 50 days. In February Lindh was flown to the Alexandria City Jail
in Alexandria, Virginia. The government charged John Walker Lindh in criminal court and
sentences could have carried multiple life sentences. The trial was set to begin in August later on
that year. Before a suppression hearing, there was a deal struck. The government dropped nine of
the ten charges and Lindh plead guilty to violating economic sanction imposed by a 1999
Executive Order by President Clinton and a weapons charge. The prosecution dropped the
sentence to twenty years. The Department of Justice claimed they could classify John Walk
Lindh as an enemy combatant at any point of the process.93
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Richard Reid
Richard Reid was born in London and had traveled to both Pakistan and Afghanistan
where he allegedly received training from al Qaeda. On a flight from Paris to Miami he
attempted to detonate a shoe bomb. He was charged in a criminal court and plead guilty to eight
counts of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. He is currently serving life
imprisonment (in the same prison as John Walk Lindh).94
Zacarias Moussaoui
Zacarias Moussaoui commonly referred to as the "20th hijacker" was a French national of
Moroccan descent. He was arrested one month before the attacks on September 11th on an
immigration violation after a flight school in Minnesota contacted the FBI. The flight school
reported that Moussaoui was interested only in learning how to fly a plane, not take off or land.
The government never classified Zacarias Moussaoui as an enemy combatant, and the
prosecution charged Moussaoui in criminal court. After pleading guilty, The court sentenced
Moussaoui to life without parole.
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who was born in Kyrgyzstan and became a naturalized U.S. citizen,
was apprehended and April 18, 2013, for detonating multiple bombs at the Boston Marathon just
days earlier. He was severely injured and had to be hospitalized. In the hospital, special
counterterrorism agents, (not the military) were permitted the Obama Administration to question
without Mirandizing Dzhokhar. He confessed to planting to bombs at the Boston Marathon. Over
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the next two days, Tsarnaev was questioned by the government for over 16 hours. Dzhokhar was
read his Miranda rights on April 22, 2013.95 In this instance, the public safety exception was
invoked by those who were questioning Tsarnaev. According to the Department of Justice public
safety outweighed Dzhokhar's right to be informed of his Fifth Amendment rights. That same
day the White House issued a statement that the government would not classify Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev as an enemy combatant. The White House's decision was the opposite of what
Republican lawmakers were calling for over the weekend. Senator Graham from South Carolina
insisted that Tsarnaev should be held as an enemy combatant. Senator Graham agreed that the
government could not try Tsarnaev via military commission, but being held as an enemy
combatant "would allow authorities to take their time gleaning information from him.”96
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was found guilty on all thirty counts (17 of which were charges that carry the
death penalty) including:









Conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, resulting in death
Use of a weapon of mass destruction resulting in death
Possession and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, resulting in
death
Bombing of a place of public use resulting in death; aiding and abetting
Conspiracy to maliciously destroy property, resulting in death
Malicious destruction of property by means of an explosive
Carjacking, resulting in serious bodily injury
Interference with commerce by threats and violence97

95

Hannah Lonky, Revisiting the public safety exception to Miranda for suspected terrorists: Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev and the bombing of the 2013 Boston Marathon, 2017.
96
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/04/22/obama-tsarnaev-enemy-combatant/2103635/
97
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/jury-reaches-verdict-boston-bombing-trial

52

Conclusion
The United States' government apprehended Hamdi and Lindh from the same prison in
Afghanistan, yet their cases unfolded completely differently. John Walker Lindh charged with:








Conspiracy to murder U.S. citizens or U.S. nationals
Two counts of providing material support and resources to terrorist organizations
One count of supplying services to the Taliban
Conspiracy to contribute services to al Qaeda
Contributing services to al Qaeda
Conspiracy to supply services to the Taliban
Using and carrying firearms and destructive devices during crimes of violence

The government accused Hamdi of fighting with the Taliban against the U.S. and Northern
Alliance forces. Another major issue between Hamdi and Lindh is that the United States released
Hamdi from custody in 2004 and Lindh is as of 2018 still held in a federal supermax prison.
Designation as an enemy combatant is a rationale for holding a suspect indefinitely when the
government does not have enough evidence to charge. In the case of al-Marri, the government
changed its mind twice with how to charge him. This chapter shows that there is little success in
trying citizens as enemy combatants and based on the lack of charges in many cases one could
infer that the United States' government had errored in holding prisoners. The government used
the classification as an enemy combatant for justification to hold suspects indefinitely without
charge even though there are not criteria that any branch of the government agrees on. No final
ruling in any of the above cases expressed either way on the constitutionality of the classification
of suspected terrorists as enemy combatants.
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Table 4: Enemy Combatant Cases

Case

Date

Citizenship

Hamdi

2004

United States

Place of
Apprehension
Afghanistan

Classification

Where Detained Charges Filed

Enemy
Combatant
Enemy
Combatant
None

U.S. Naval Brig

No, released

Padilla

2004

United States

United States

U.S. Naval Brig

Yes, in
criminal court
No, released

Rasul

2004

Afghanistan

Hamdan

2006

British &
Australian
Yemeni

Afghanistan

Enemy
Combatant

Guantanamo

Boumed
iene

2008

AlMarri

2009

Algerian
native
Naturalized
Bosnian
Qatari
Permanent
Resident of
the United
States

Bosnia

Enemy
Combatant

Guantanamo

United States

Enemy
Combatant

U.S. Naval Brig
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Guantanamo

Yes, in
military
tribunal. Later
overturned
No, released

Yes, in
criminal court

Table 5: Criminal Justice Cases

Case

Date

Citizenship

Lindh
Reid
Moussaoui

2002
2002
2002

Tsarnaev

2015

United States
British
French
National
United States

Place of
Apprehension
Afghanistan
United States
United States

Classification

United States
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Charges Filed

None
None
None

Where
Detained
Virginia
Massachusetts
Minnesota

None

Massachusetts

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

CHAPTER FOUR: WHY THE EXECUTIVE DOES NOT HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO CLASSIFY U.S. CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS

Introduction
The founders of the United States sacrificed for certain rights and protections over 200
years ago. The fear of another terrorist attack is not a valid reason for the United States to turn its
back on those values. There can be a balance of both individual freedom, liberty, and national
security. The Constitution is where we find the roadmap for this balance.
This paper argues that administrations after the 9/11 attacks have both manipulated and
made up the law to protect the nation. The term enemy combatant was created as descriptive
term. However, the descriptiveness of the term enemy combatant morphed into a status. This
status meant that certain rights for the accused were violated. Many members from different
branches of the government used the term enemy combatant like it was a legal term or term of
art. The government failed to provide due process to those it designated as enemy combatants
under both the Geneva Convention and the Constitution. The following chapter will present six
different arguments as to why the executive does not have authority to designate a U.S. citizen as
an enemy combatant. Since the September 11th attacks, the executive branch has argued that its
authority to designate enemy combatants comes from the AUMF from 2001 and the executive’s
inherent war powers. It has claimed that these powers give him unreviewable discretion in the
classification of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants. The executive has also claimed that since
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suspected terrorists have infringed on human rights they have no rights of their own such as due
process or POW status.
Executive Use of Enemy Combatant is Against the Expressed and Implied Will of Congress
The executive has argued that the United States is at war with terrorist organizations and
the executive has unreviewable discretion under his war power to detain suspected terrorists.
However, Congress has passed legislation that established that the Executive does not have the
authority to use the term enemy combatant, even in wartime. The formula that is used to
determine the scope of constitutional Presidential authority is cited from Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer where Justice Jackson describes three different zones of authority. The
maximum zone is when the President acts “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress.”98 In this zone judicial interpretation gives it widest latitude, for the president is acting
under all of his authority plus what Congress can delegate. The twilight zone is the second zone
of authority Jackson discusses. When Congress neither denies nor grants authority, the President
must only use his own “independent powers.” The zone of twilight is the place where the
President and Congress may have concurrent powers or where the distribution is not certain. In
the twilight zone the judiciary will test the level of Presidential power depending on the
circumstances rather than “on abstract theories of law.”99 The third zone is when the President’s
authority is at its lowest ebb. This zone is when the President acts against the implied will of
Congress. In this instance the President can act under his authority minus any authority that
Congress is given by the Constitution.
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According to Article I of the Constitution, Congress has the power to make rules
concerning captures on land and water. Congress used this authority to issue this statute, 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a), the NDA, “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United
States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”100 Congress was in the realm of its constitutional
powers by making rules about not detaining United States citizens accept via an Act of Congress.
Multiple opinions in both Hamdi and Padilla agree that when it comes to a U.S. citizen on
U.S. soil the AUMF does not satisfy requirements of the Non-Detention Act (NDA).101 Justice
Souter and Ginsberg in Hamdi declare, “In requiring that any Executive detention be "pursuant
to an Act of Congress," then, Congress necessarily meant to require a congressional enactment
that clearly authorized detention or imprisonment.”102 The NDA prohibits detention of U.S.
citizens except in the case of an Act of Congress. The AUMF is not the Act of Congress that
fulfills this requirement. Justice Scalia goes as far as to say that there is no constitutional or
statutory authority to detain a United States’ citizen without trial.103 In using the status of enemy
combatant the President is violated a statute, and therefore the expressed will of Congress.
An example of an act of Congress that would authorize the use of the term enemy
combatant and detention of U.S. citizens in that case is proposed legislation H.R. 5684 of the
107th Congress.
“Detention of Enemy Combatants Act - Authorizes the detention of a U.S. person or
resident as an enemy combatant if that individual is an al Qaeda member or knowingly
cooperated with an al Qaeda member in planning, authorizing, committing, aiding, or
abetting a terrorist act against the United States. Directs the Secretary of Defense to
prescribe, publish, and report the standards, process, and criteria: (1) to be used in
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determining that an American citizen or lawful resident is an enemy combatant; and (2)
for that individual's detention.”104
This legislation was not pass and therefore the authority was not given and the expressed will of
Congress that United States citizens should not be detained as enemy combatants is still in effect.
The MCA in 2006 codified that an unlawful enemy combatant was “a person who has
engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant.”105 This definition
amended Title X and added the term unlawful enemy combatant. When asked by the Court in
Boumediene in 2008 the executive used its own definition: “an enemy combatant is an individual
who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”106
In 2009 Congress amended Title X 948(a) removing “unlawful enemy combatants” and
replacing with “unprivileged enemy belligerent.” The chapter goes on to say that only an alien
unprivileged belligerent could be tried by military commission. An alien unprivileged belligerent
cannot invoke protections of the Geneva Convention. This is clearly the expressed will of
Congress that the term enemy combatant should no longer be given as a status to either send a
person to Guantanamo, or try by military commission. Enemy belligerent is similar in its
definition but differs in how it is not applied specifically to United States citizens as a status. The
executive is now at its lowest ebb in its presidential power to use or designate anyone as an
enemy combatant. Justice Jackson explains how serious this is:
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“Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”107
Congress was no longer indifferent to this authority exercised by the executive.108 No longer was
classifying U.S. citizens as enemy combatants and “open field,” Congress had covered it by
“statutory policies inconsistent with this” [designation.]109 The AUMF omits authority to detain
and now Title X of the U.S. States code omits the term enemy combatant.
Even with this change in United States law, there have been multiple instances where the
executive has sought or threatened to use the enemy combatant status as a weapon. When Saipov
was apprehended after being suspected of carrying out a terrorist attack in New York City in
2017 he was considered by the executive branch to be an enemy combatant.110 Even more
concerning was when a United States citizen was held for 13 months as an enemy combatant in
2018.111 From John Lindt to the petitioner in Doe v. Mattis, he executive has used the threat of
classifying a suspect as an enemy combatant as a tool of intimidation.
In the case of classifying a United States citizen as an enemy combatant, Congress has
expressed its will by the passing of the NDA and amendments to Title X. Secondly, there is no
Constitutional authority that the executive can use to classify a U.S. citizen as an enemy
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combatant and therefore not charge a citizen with a crime and indefinitely detain. Thirdly, the
Constitution actually authorizes Congress to make rules concerning capture on land and water.
There is no authority the Executive can claim to legally justify this treatment of United States
citizens.
Executive Use of Enemy Combatant is Not Authorized by the AUMF
In 2018 President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13823. “The President
maintains authority to detain certain persons as part of his Constitutional powers as Commander
in Chief and Chief Executive and those provided by the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) of September 18, 2001.”112 The Authorization for the use of Military Force from 2001
does not authorize executive use of the status of “enemy combatant” because today suspected
terrorists are not covered under the umbrella of, “those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001.”113 A suspected terrorist today may be covered only if are a part of the
original al-Qaeda. President Barrack Obama stated in 2013:
“The AUMF is now nearly 12 years old. The Afghan war is coming to an end. Core al
Qaeda is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years
to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible
threat to the United States. Unless we discipline our thinking, our definitions, our
actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight, or continue to grant
Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation
states. So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to
refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to
expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations
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must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s
what our democracy demands.”114
It would be hard to justify today how one could use that authority against that group or any other
group that was not involved with the attacks on September 11th. The AUMF calls for the
President to use all necessary and appropriate force for those involved with the attacks that
occurred on September 11,2001 .The AUMF does not list detention specifically, yet the Supreme
Court ruled in Hamdi that the AUMF gives the executive authority detain enemy combatants. 115
Despite the ruling in Hamdi, seven justices agreed with Justice O’Connor that indefinite
detention with the intent to interrogate is not authorized.116
The AUMF does not authorize executive use of the term enemy combatant because
indefinite detention is not an appropriate force. Classifying a United States citizen as an enemy
combatant and then detaining without trial or charge is beyond the scope of what is deemed
appropriate.
Executive use of Enemy Combatant is a Breach of the Separation of Powers
“In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree
of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well
entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain
security.”117 Judges in both Hamdi (Scalia’s Dissent) and in the District Court opinion for the
case called attention to the separation of powers doctrine and the necessity of more than one
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branch being involved in the issue of detainees. Scalia declared, “I frankly do not know whether
these tools are sufficient to meet the Government’s security needs…It is far beyond my
competence, or the Court’s competence, to determine that. But it is not beyond Congress’s”118
Scalia agrees with the Fourth Circuit view that Articles I and II of the United States Constitution
declare shared powers in military affairs between Congress and the Executive. Article I of the
Constitution is even more specific. It gives to Congress the power to make rules concerning
captures on land and water.119 Judge Floyd also shared Scalia’s sentiment “If the law in its
current status is found by the President to be insufficient to protect this country from terrorist
plots…then the President should prevail upon Congress to remedy the problem.”120 The judiciary
has made clear that when it comes to war powers Congress and the Executive should work
together, not put the Court in the position to deal with these matters. This is another argument
that supports the use of a clear and consistent codifiable policy. If the Executive feels that current
mechanisms in place in the criminal justice system are insufficient to keep the nation safe
domestically, then he should seek to work with Congress to remedy the issue. While the
Executive may have broad powers over foreign policy, when it comes to domestic issues the
power does not stretch as far.
Applying war powers domestically to United States citizens when war is not declared is a
breach of the separation of powers doctrine. The executive has claimed authority from inherent
war powers to classify enemy combatants. In Hamdi that authority for the executive to exercise
its war powers was because the AUMF had been enacted. The Hamdi case made it clear that war
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powers were when both Congress and the Executive worked together. It also discussed in the
case that the Executive would not have the same authority if a terrorist was not apprehended on
the battlefield of active combat operation.121 In Padilla the government claimed unreviewable
discretion. This goes against the standing view of the separation of powers doctrine interfering
with both Congress’ and the Judicial branch’s “performance of its constitutionally designed
function.”122 Here the executive is overstepping the boundaries of its presidential power when
the executive branch creates the criteria (a legislative function) for enemy combatants and
applies the criteria in the classification of enemy combatants (a judicial function). In Hamdan
multiple justices including Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg
voiced concern that the Executive is defining, prosecuting, and adjudicating without independent
review.123 Even when Congress attempted to define enemy combatant in the MCA, the executive
used its own definition in Supreme Court cases such as Boumediene after that law was enacted.
The government reverted back to the definition adopted in Hamdan an "enemy combatant" is an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”124
In the past when addressing the Executive’s war powers, the United States has fought a
proper noun such as Germany not a common noun such as terrorism.125 When the United States
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has fought wars against common nouns such as crime, poverty, and drugs, the U.S. has been less
successful.126 A proper noun such as Germany can surrender. Terrorism, on the other hand, will
likely never surrender or give up. The fight against terrorists is not truly a war when seeking to
use constitutional war powers.127 The government cannot argue that this war against terrorism
gives unreviewable discretion under war powers to designate suspected terrorists (or even those
suspected of associating with terrorist originations) as enemy combatants to detain indefinitely.
This paper does not argue that the president does not have war powers or that Congress
did not authorize specific use of force in 2001. In the fall of 2001, President Bush sent troops to
Afghanistan under the authority of the AUMF. Shortly thereafter, Hamdi was captured by the
Northern Alliance and taken into U.S. custody afterwards. The government claimed authority to
detain Hamdi and the Court agreed. This situation brings up two dilemmas. First, if the U.S.
government is compelled to indefinitely hold a U.S. citizen, then why was John Walker Lindh
treated completely differently? Lindh was indicted, tried and convicted in civilian court and is
still being held. Secondly, the court discussed that Hamdi’s continued detention was based on the
fact that there were ongoing active hostilities in Afghanistan. When active hostilities are over,
the authority to still detain a person under Executive war powers wanes. Justice Souter discusses
this in the oral arguments of the Hamdi case:
“Is it reasonable to think that the, that the authorization was sufficient at the time that it
was passed, but that at some point, it is a Congressional responsibility, and ultimately a
constitutional right on [Hamdi's] part, for Congress to assess the situation and either pass
a more specific continuing authorization or at least to come up with the conclusion that
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its prior authorization was good enough. Doesn't Congress at some point have a
responsibility to do more than pass that resolution?”128
Executive Use of Enemy Combatant Violates Due Process
Due process provides essential rights for a defendant which is an essential core value of
the United States. These essential rights include the right to counsel, to be informed of charges,
to confront both evidence and witnesses, and to have a neutral decision maker. The classification
of a U.S. Citizen as an “enemy combatant” infringes on due process. The government could
wrongly imprison anyone with no accountability. The judiciary must be able to call the jailer into
account.129 There have been various times the United States has provided due process, even in
times of war. A state of war is not a “blank check” for the Executive power.130 The United States
can stay true to its values even in the face of terrorism. War is not an excuse to abandon the
values of the country. Rumsfeld discussed the same rational that is used for POW (even though
enemy combatants are not given POW status). Detaining enemy combatants keeps them from
returning to the battlefield. He states that due process, the presumption of innocence, and the
right to council encumber the goal of preventing future acts of terrorism.131 The United States
can still prevent a suspected terrorist from “returning to the battlefield” with due process by
using preventative detention through the criminal justice system. Suspects would have access to
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counsel, charges would be filed, and their detention would not be indefinite. However, judicial
review would ensure that suspects could not return to the battlefield by holding them without
bond.
Executive Use of Enemy Combatant Violates International Humanitarian Law
The Geneva Conventions list two categories of detained persons, civilian and combatant.
It makes clear that every person has status under international law. No person falls outside of the
law. “Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”132 Under the law of war and
Common Article 3 and article 75 of the additional protocol both civilian and combatant have the
right to: counsel, to confront witnesses, an impartial court, and regular judicial procedures. The
United States has repeatedly declared that terrorism and members of the Taliban and al Qaeda
have made the Geneva Conventions obsolete.133 The executive has specifically declared that
enemy combatants are not protected by the Geneva Conventions. The Joint Doctrine for Detainee
Operations created a third category of detainee, an enemy combatant, a person who is not
entitled to the privileges of the Geneva Convention.Violating international humanitarian law in
executive use of the enemy combatant to circumvent due process puts U.S. citizens both those in
the military and civilians at risk oversees. The United States cannot expect the world to treat
United States citizens that are either civilian or combatant with the protections of the law of war
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or Geneva Conventions when the U.S. is not willing to do the same. Both civilian and combatant
are afforded regular judicial procedures regardless of status or crimes.134
Executive Use of Enemy Combatant is not Established in International Law
This paper has shown that prior to the September 11th attacks, the term enemy combatant
was not a term of art or an established legal category of persons in international law. It is
certainly not a legal term that would make a person fall outside of the protections of the Geneva
Convention. In published case law prior to 2011, the use of enemy combatant was inconsistent in
its definition, who it was applied to, and in what circumstances. In Quirin, the case that the
government repeatedly cites precedent for its use, the term enemy combatant is used once. In its
one use enemy combatant was used interchangeably as a descriptive term for the spies who had
violated the laws of war. It was used to describe foreign captured soldiers who had violated laws
of war in re Yamashita.135 There is no established uniform use or definition that would make the
term enemy combatant an established legal category of persons under international law.
Conclusion
After September 11th the government sought to navigate uncharted waters in its war
against terrorism. Originally the term “unlawful combatant” was used to categorize the suspected
terrorists that were being detained. The term “enemy combatant” was invented to communicate
that the United States was holding suspects because they were enemies, not because they were
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criminals. Enemy combatant was the “appropriate adjective,” it was used so that they American
people could understand why these detainees were being held.136
If a United States citizen is classified as this “appropriate adjective” that is no longer in
U.S. code they can be held indefinitely without due processes. They can be held incommunicado
without access to a lawyer or being charged with a crime. This did not just happen a few times
back in 2001, but persists to this day. The fact that the government does not consistently use a
definition as to what an enemy combatant actually is, should concern Untied States citizens.
Instead of an inconsistent and arguably unsuccessful application of the term enemy
combatant the United States should follow the outlined policy. If a citizen is an enemy to the
United States, either fighting on a battlefield or in an armed conflict they can be held as an
unlawful combatant. Even with this designation or status they would privy to a level of due
process outlined in the Geneva Conventions. They should be treated humanely and “sentences
must ... be pronounced by a regularly constituted court.”137 Detaining indefinitely, in solitude
with no charges filed or way to dispute their status in not humane treatment. If a United States
citizen commits an act of terror on U.S. soil they should be charged in civilian court according to
Title XVIII. Terrorism is clearly defined in U.S. code and the penalties also published. U.S. code
define "domestic terrorism" as:
“Activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State; appear to be intended—to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping;”
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Specific crimes of terrorism such as use of weapons of mass destruction, bombings of places of
public use and infrastructure, missile systems designed to destroy aircraft, radiological dispersal
devises, acts of nuclear terrorism, harboring or concealing terrorists, receiving military-type
training from a foreign terrorist organization, and providing material support to terrorists all
carry possible years to life sentences. Where it is allowed by law the penalty could be punished
by death.138
As the United States navigates its post-9/11 fight against terrorism, it must adhere to the
values that it is seeking to defend. The Constitution, including the separation of powers doctrine,
due process, and international humanitarian law can all be adhered to in the face of the threat of
terrorism. “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”139 It is unjust to use a term that
was meant as a descriptive term to impute on a United States citizen a status that strips them of
their Constitutional rights.

138

18 U.S. Code § 2331

139

Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from the Birmingham Jail (San Francisco : Harper San Francisco, 1994.
1st ed. 1994).
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